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Abstract                 
                              
The preoccupations about conceiving and promoting efficient anti-corruption strategies 
exist in most states, especially in the developing countries.  
 
The opportunity of such strategies derives from the direct link, demonstrated theoretically 
and empirically, between the effects of the anti-corruption strategies and government 
performance, translated both in the economic and social results and living standard, 
welfare etc. 
 
In the last decades, the transnational actors – UN, World Bank, OECD, EU etc. -  have 
affirmed as promoters of own anti-corruption strategies,  directing the states’ efforts, 
conferring adequate levels of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency or sustainability. 
 
The South-Eastern European states incorporate own anti-corruption strategies in the 
framework of general strategies, aiming the government reform in the context of the 
European integration process.  
 
Strengthening the public integrity, reducing corruption, developing a genuine climate of 
economic freedom become important objectives concerning the impact on government 
performance. 
 
The paper incorporates briefly the main characteristics of anti-corruption strategies, 
developed by transnational actors and it aims to shape theoretical and empirical 
frameworks for the assessment of anti-corruption strategies. 
 
The focus on some South-Eastern European states has a demonstrative character, as the 
presented analyses may be extended to various geo-political areas. 
 
 
Key words: anti-corruption strategies, assessment, impact, government performance. 
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Introduction 
 
Corruption, through extended and diversified forms of expression has become an object 
of study and analysis, both for experts, analysts and public authorities and institutions. 
The latter, concerned by the effects of corruption on the social and economic 
development have aimed and achieved a series of anti-corruption strategies, focused on 
combating and eliminating the causes of corruption, thus also their consequences. For the 
public organizations, found frequently in public administrations and generally in the 
public sector, theories have been formulated aimed at minimization of the corruption 
phenomena.  
 
The governance processes and corruption phenomena are in a direct connection and 
benefit of profound analyses. Dealing corruption from the economic, cultural or political 
perspective, Rose-Ackerman (2005, 4-5) reveals four dimensions:  
 The first one is carried out on the background of public organisations, state and 
society, where corruption could create inefficiency and inequity. The purpose of 
reforms is not to eliminate corruption but to improve state efficiency, fairness and 
legitimacy. In this context, it is worth to mention a fundamental idea for the anti- 
corruption strategies: “the total elimination of corruption will never be 
worthwhile, but steps can be taken to limit its reach and reduce the harms it 
causes”  
 Corruption has different meanings in different societies. It is difficult to establish 
a clear border between legal and illegal, between merit and bribe.  
 How the basic structures of the public and private sector can produce or repress 
corruption. The prospect of a reform will change both the constitutional structures 
and the fundamental relation between market and state.  
 The difficulty of reform for public or governmental organisations and the role of 
the international community in reform. The internal reform policy is essential, and 
between various organisations valuable lessons can be transferred even if the 
conditions are not always similar.  
 
Although the author asserts: “this book does not present a blueprint for reform”, she 
suggests “a range of alternatives that reforms must tailor to the conditions in 
individual countries”. However “reform should not be limited to the creation of 
integrity systems” and “the primary goal should be to reduce the underlying 
incentives to pay and receive bribes, not to tighten systems of ex post control”.  
Previously to Rose-Ackerman’s assertions, Banfield (1975, 593) analyses the key 
features that a public organization should meet in order to minimize corruption. 
Briefly, they are:  
 the executive agents are selected on the basis of probity and institutional 
loyalty;  
 there is a complete set of positive motivations for the loyal public service 
(including a high salary);  
 there is a complete set of negative motivations, applied compulsory when 
corrupt acts were already identified;  
 the goals and missions for a job are formulated clearly and univoque by director;  
 the agents hold the necessary discretion for executing the job tasks;  
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 no ambiguities in rules;  
 the director monitors the agent’s performance;  
 if there is the smallest doubt about the agent’s probity, he/she is dismissed.  
 the director, on his/her turn is also monitored.  
 
The preoccupations of international organisations may be added to the above contributions, 
substantiating anti-corruption strategies at the level of government or sectoral public 
organisations. In this respect, the World Bank has asserted as an important and competent 
actor in the analysis concerning the causes and consequences of corruption. The control of 
corruption has become a core indicator of governance and the strategies grounded on this 
indicator represent pillars for national authorities.  
The World Bank promotes good governance and anti-corruption actions as important pillars 
for reducing the poverty. The World Bank sustains the national or regional efforts for public 
integrity, minimization of corruption, as well as awarding assistance to countries in view of 
governance improvement and control of corruption, by means of the World Bank Institute 
(WBI).  
The preoccupations about designing and promoting anti-corruption policies and strategies as 
well as evaluating the causes/consequences of the corruption phenomenon are also present in 
the European Union, OECD or other transnational bodies such as International Monetary 
Fund, USAID, Transparency International, Heritage Foundation etc.  
 
I.  Basic approaches to anti-corruption 
 
McCusker (2006) achieves a review of anti-corruption strategies. 
McCusker’s paper reassesses and valorises relevant contributions, both of the 
transnational actors (Word Bank, IMF, OECD, UNDP, Transparency International etc.) 
as well as of authors recognised for their publications analysing the causes and 
consequences of corruption and defining the directions of action for the fight against 
corruption. 
 
Structured in several chapters, the most important ones for our study are as follows: 
assessment and design, implementation and impact assessment, specific methods and 
measures etc. 
The above author draws attention to the fact that in designing an anti-corruption strategy, 
it is imperative to be aware of the fundamental characteristics and nature of corruption 
itself. 
Three key schools of thought on corruption reduction and prevention are emphasised 
(McCusker, 2006, 8-9): 
 
 interventionism, in which the relevant authorities wait for the corrupt action to 
occur and then intervene to capture and punish the offender. This school 
stimulates retribution, rehabilitation and deterrence but there remain a number of 
obstructive variables including:  
- the harm has already occurred and cannot be undone; 
- the majority of crimes remain unreported; 
- the demand on finite resources will inevitably be infinite given the degree 
of supervision necessary to ensure that the deterrence effect operates. 
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 managerialism, in which those individuals or agencies seeking to engage in 
corrupt behaviour can be discouraged or prevented from doing so by establishing 
appropriate systems, procedures and protocols. In essence, managerialism 
advocates the reduction or elimination of opportunities such that those who 
generally benefit from them cease to be able to do so. There are limitations with 
this school of thought also, key amongst which are the fact that individuals do not 
necessarily operate according to the predetermined principles of managerialism. 
Organisations contain three broad categories of people who will react differently 
to corrupt influences: 
- category I: people who want to do the right thing and require guidance on 
how to achieve this;  
- category II: people who are too timid to take the risk of operating outside 
set rules;  
- category III: people who are corrupt and will operate outside of the rules 
entirely. 
 
 organisational integrity which involves the integration of an organisation’s 
operational systems, corruption control strategies and ethical standards so that a 
norm of ethical behaviour is created. This school of thought presupposes that 
deviance stems from the organisation rather than the individuals of which it is 
comprised, as if the breach of ethics involved in corrupt practices occurs almost 
by osmosis from the malfeasant organisation to the innocent individual within it. 
Arguably, targeting individuals in anti-corruption efforts is likely to be less 
successful than targeting the organisational context in which individuals operate.  
 
The same author highlights other two aspects that may substantiate the national anti-
corruption strategies 
- corruption as a system of interlocking vicious cycles (Figure 1); 
- causes of public corruption and fraud have different importance related to 
the level of income in every country (Table 1). 
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                     Figure 1: Corruption as a system of interlocking vicious cycles 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cobb & Gonzalez 2005:6 
 
                        Table 1. Importance of causes of public corruption and fraud 
 
                                                                                                                                  Important cause 
                                                                                                          Higher income     
                                                                                                                  country 
 Lower income      
       country 
Factors          % rank            % rank 
Norms and values of politicians and public servants 88.4 1 98.4  1 
Lack of control, supervision, auditing 87.2 2 93.3  2 
Interrelationships – business, politics, state 86.6 3 92.9  3 
Values and norms concerning government/state 84.6 4 79.7 11 
Public sector culture (values/norms) 83.3 5 76.8 12 
Lack of commitment of leadership 82.2 6 90.2  5 
Misorganisation and mismanagement 80.7 7 91.9  4 
Increasing strength of organised crime 79.3 8 90.0  7 
Norms and values [in] private and public [life] 78.0 9 73.7 14 
Increasing significance of lobbying 76.5 10 72.9 15 
Interrelationships – politics and administration 67.0 11 86.4  9 
Social inequality 66.7 12 90.2  6 
Low salaries in the public sector 56.9 16 87.1  8 
Economic problems (inflation/recession) 62.2 14 85.2 10 
(n)     (190)          (67)  
 
Source: Huberts, 1998:7 
 
B:  More payments to 
political parties by 
appointees 
A:  Greater control 
over appointments 
by political parties 
D:  More jobs in the 
civil service 
C:  Less effective 
judicial system 
G:  More regulations 
to justify more jobs 
in the civil service 
J:  More businesses       
  remain in the 
informal  economy 
F:  More organized 
crime and 
 narcotrafficking 
I: Less transparency 
in international 
negotiations 
L:  Less favourable 
international 
agreements 
K:  Lower revenues 
for the government 
H:  Lower salaries
E:  More civil 
servants and corrupt 
and/or incompetent 
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Karklins (2005) proposes an own scenario for the game theory in view to substantiate the 
anti-corruption strategies. 
Karklins’s chart (2005, 150) assumes:  
 a structure based on three pillars - corrupter, corruptee, third actor – placed in 
different hypostases of winner or loser; 
 understanding the interactions between each actor within a succession of 
scenarios that will form the anti-corruption strategy.  
 
 
                                   Table 2: Corruption winners and losers 
 
  Corrupter (A) Corruptee (B)  Third Actor (C) 
1 Win Win Win 
2 Win Win Lose 
3 Win Lose Win 
4 Win Lose Lose 
5 Lose Win Win (anti-corruption goal) 
6 Lose Lose Win (anti-corruption goal) 
7 Lose Win Lose 
8 Lose Lose Lose 
 
            Source: Karklins, 2005: 150   
             
 
In Table 2, A and B can be either a citizen or an official. C can be another citizen, 
competitor, supervisor or the public at large. 
 
II. Models of the assessment frameworks for the anti-corruption strategies 
 
The models presented below aim the most relevant examples of assessment of the anti-
corruption strategies, usually designed and promoted at the initiative of transnational actors 
such as World Bank or European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Of course the 
models presented, belong to authors recognised for their contributions and expertise in the 
study on corruption and anti-corruption. McCusker (2006, 36-76) presents a comprehensive 
list of the most recognised contributions in the mentioned fields. For the needs of our study, 
we shall approach Huther and Shah (2000), Steves and Rousso (2003), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993), Gamboa-Cavazos et al. (2006) as well as Matei (2006), Andrei, Matei and Rosca 
(2009, Ch. 6, 143-161) or Matei and Matei (2009). 
 
II.1 Corruption market as support of the models for assessing the anti-corruption strategies 
The “corruption market” is up to present an abstract model, difficult for 
operationalisation in empirical studies. However, it draws attention to the need to 
emphasise the possible actors and scenarios of corruption in view to be able to 
substantiate models of assessment of the anti-corruption strategies. 
Regarding the relation between government performance and corruption, other papers 
also confirm the non-linear character of this relation and the fact that “at low or high 
 8
levels of performance of a ruling party or politician, the corruption is more intense, while 
at intermediate levels, is weaker” (Gamboa-Cavazos et al., 2006). 
Moreover, the study already mentioned discovers that the firms that accumulate more 
incomes from their industries are those willing to offer more bribery, fact also directly 
related to the political stability. The relation between the corrupt and the corruptor is 
bivalent in the sense that each of the two actors may be an active actor. As such, the 
reality confirms that for instance, in the case of the firms in economic decline, the public 
persons pretend higher payments for corruption. In a mutual way, the entrepreneurs have 
the impulse to bribe the officials with stable and long term political horizons. For those, 
the supply for corruption is increasing both in number and effective value.  
Most of the times, in the relation established between the corrupt and the corruptor, 
negotiation and intermediation usually occur under the form of traffic of influence where 
public or private persons are involved.  
As such, we can talk of a corruption market which may appear at the interface between 
the public and private. The dimensions of this market differ from one country to another 
and depend on different factors, amongst which we found the ones described in the 
previous sections.  
The corruption market is based itself on several principles to which one can add or 
further detail (Matei, 2006, 8-9; Andrei, Matei and Rosca, 2009, 153-158): 
 The existence of a demand and supply of corruption. Usually, goods that are 
offered or requested are public goods, public services, or different forms for 
facilitating access to the ownership of public goods or services (usually described 
by obtaining licenses, approvals, etc.). Even though they do not explicitly imply 
the existence of a market for corruption, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) analyze 
corruption in the context offered by the demand and supply of public goods. They 
suggest that there is a competition between a seller and a buyer which enables the 
extension of corruption.  
 The mechanisms that regulate the functioning of the corruption market  are not 
legal or visible and generally, refer to law imperfections, lack of control from 
legal instances and of course, favourable attitude to corrupt or being corrupted, 
adopted by public or private persons; 
 In relation to the intensity of the ratio between the demand and supply of 
corruption, there is a price of corruption expressed, usually, by bribery. The 
appearance of such a price differs from the one to be found in economic theory 
and basis itself upon factors related to economic circumstances, opportunity of 
public interventions, etc., as well as power and political and administrative 
position of the one corrupted.  
The above principles have been taken into account, even though, not explicitly, by other 
authors, as well. We refer here to Campante (2005) or Gamboa – Cavazos (2006). 
 9
As in any other market, the actors try to maximize their profits. As such, for the offer of 
corruption where the actor is a public person, politician, governmental official, etc., the 
evaluation tendency will increase, while for the demand, having as an actor a private 
person, an entrepreneur, owner of private employee, the evaluation tendency of the 
opportunity of corruption will decrease.  
 
II.2. Models for assessing the anti-corruption strategies developed by the World Bank 
 
II.2.1 A Simple Evaluation Framework – Huther-Shah Model 
 
The model described below is broadly presented in Huther and Shah (2000, 2-8). 
The economic support of the proposed assessment framework consists in an adapted 
version of the cost-benefit analysis. We also find additional considerations on the use of 
the cost-benefit analysis in view of assessing the anti-corruption strategies in Matei and 
Matei (2009). 
Coming back to Huther and Shah (2000) paper, the core ideas will be synthesised below. 
Focusing their entire approach on the corruption aspects in the development programmes 
achieved with World Bank assistance, the authors propose an assessment framework 
based on “the incentives for opportunistic behaviour by public officials” (Huther and 
Shah, 2000, 2). 
 
In order to make distinction between grand corruption and societies without corruption, 
to a large extent, the authors take into consideration the conditions where the officials 
search or accept corruption: 
 the expected gains exceed the estimated costs for achieving a corruption act; 
 little weight is placed on the costs that corruption imposes on others. 
Those two conclusions have the characteristics of hypotheses, substantiating the cost-
benefit analysis, referring to: 
 public officials’ self-interest to participate in a corruption act only when they 
expect a positive net benefit for the transaction assumed by the corruption act; 
 the implementation of anti-corruption strategies will reduce the expected gains 
and will increase the sanctions for corrupt behaviour. 
Therefore, the authors conclude: “anti- corruption programs must change the cost-benefit 
calculations of public officials who believe that the expected net benefits of corruption 
are positive” (Huther and Shah, 2000, 2-3). 
 
The above statements may be formalised in the relation: 
 
E(B) = n x E(G) – prob [P] x [P] > 0      (1) 
 
where:  E is the expectations operator; 
  n is number of corrupt transactions; 
  G is the gain from the corrupt transaction; 
  Prob [P] is the probability of paying a penalty; 
P is the penalty for the corrupt activity. 
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The relation (1) becomes essential for the assessment of anti-corruption strategies, 
determining the mechanisms that influence the corruption level: 
 reducing the number of transactions involving public officials; 
 reducing the possibilities of gains for each transaction; 
 increasing the probability to pay penalties/sanctions for corrupt behaviour. 
The factors influencing each element of the cost-benefit analysis are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 The influence of anti-corruption programs on officials’ cost-benefit analysis 
 
Number of 
Corrupt 
Transactions 
Gross Gains from 
Corruption 
 
Probability of 
Paying 
Penalty 
Magnitude 
of Penalty 
 
Actions Not 
Influencing Cost 
Benefit Analysis 
Bureaucratic 
Culture – 
Streamlining 
Services 
Economic Reform 
– 
Improving 
Competitive 
Environment 
Anti- 
Corruption 
Agencies 
 
Rationalization 
of 
laws 
 
Raising 
Awareness of 
Public through 
Seminars 
Creating or 
Raising 
Public Service 
Standards 
Scaling Down 
Individual Public 
Projects 
 
Parliamentary 
Oversight 
 
 Public Opinion 
Surveys 
 
Reducing Public 
Employment 
Bureaucratic 
Culture 
Ombudsman  Raising Public 
Sector Wages 
Reducing Public 
Sector Size 
Referenda on Large 
Public Projects 
Financial 
Accountability 
 Reducing Wage 
Compression 
Financial 
Liberalization 
 Media 
Independence 
  
Increasing 
Transparency 
 Judicial 
Independence 
  
Decentralization 
of 
Public Services 
 Citizen 
Participation 
 
  
Economic Reform 
– Privatization 
 Rule of Law 
 
  
  Ethics Office   
 
Source: Huther and Shah (2000, 5) 
 
 
 
In view of assessing the anti-corruption strategies, the multiple objectives and actions 
enumerated in Table 3, Huther and Shah (2000, 6) formulate two questions: 
 how to establish the priorities of anti-corruption campaign; 
 which actions should be used to meet those targets. 
The answer may be substantiated differently. 
From economic point of view, the priority actions should combat the reduction of welfare 
caused by corruption. 
 
The authors state that operationalisation of such criteria of prioritization is difficult due to 
the fact that often the quantification of losses due to corruption is impossible and large 
losses are the result of multiple causes, including governance failure.  
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Therefore, prioritization of anti-corruption activities should  rely on analysis of  
economic, political and bureaucratic conditions of every state. 
 
Among the reasons for prioritization of the above-mentioned anti-corruption activities, 
Huther and Shah (2000, 7) present a quite diverse list: 
 using the public opinion survey; 
 reducing the size of public sector; 
 increasing financial accountability; 
 bureaucratic culture; 
 decentralization; 
 media independence; 
 judicial independence; 
 citizen participation. 
 
II.2.2.  OED methodology adapted in view to assess the anti-corruption strategies 
 
The same authors, Huther and Shah (2000, 8-12) present a new instrument for assessing 
the anti-corruption strategies, based on the methodology for assessing the development of 
states, achieved by Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and described by World 
Bank (2000). 
The methodology is based on the use of four key criteria: relevance, efficacy, efficiency 
and sustainability. Tavistock Institute (2003) uses similar criteria and we find their 
application for assessing the local development in Matei, Matei and Savulescu (2010, 25-
58). 
In a brief description, in general terms, the mentioned criteria comprise: 
 relevance – it establishes a connection in a certain strategy and explicit objectives 
of a policy adopted by public decision. The evaluation of relevance is qualitative 
to a great extent. 
 efficacy may incorporate both qualitative and quantitative evaluations when 
analysing if the objectives stated in a development policy were achieved, the 
adequacy of the chosen solutions as well as the influence of external factors. 
 efficiency, usually, takes into consideration an economic evaluation, taking into 
consideration the costs associated, reported to the outcomes. 
 sustainability also uses qualitative evaluations, establishing the extent to which 
the impact of a policy meets the overall needs, the social, economic, political 
needs of community and/or state. 
Referring to the anti-corruption strategies, Schacter and Shah (2000) sustain that the 
analysis on their relevance combines two factors: technical relevance and welfare 
relevance. “Technical relevance refers to the impact of specific activities on the incidence 
of corruption and the welfare relevance relates to the relative importance, for growth and 
poverty reduction of a particular type of corruption” (Huther and Shah, 2000, 8). 
 
Taking into consideration the governance quality, (Huther and Shah, 1998; Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Zoido-Loboton, 1999), quantified by “weak”, “fair”, “good”, Table 4. presents 
an assessment of the relevance of various anti-corruption programs. 
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Table 4: Ratings on Relevance of a Menu of Anti-corruption Programs 
 
Country’s Quality of Governance Program   
Weak Fair Good 
Comments 
 
Raising public awareness of 
corruption through seminars 
 
Not 
relevant 
 
Low Medium In countries with weak governance, corrupt 
practices and agents are generally well 
known. 
Raising awareness of public 
officials through seminars 
 
Not 
relevant 
 
Low Medium Public officials may be aware of corruption 
but unwilling and/or unable to take action 
due to incentive problems in countries with 
weak governance. 
Anti-corruption 
agencies / 
Ombudsman 
 
Not 
relevant 
 
Low Medium With endemic corruption, anti-corruption 
agencies or ombudsman may actually 
extort rents. Positive influence if preconditions 
for good governance exist. 
Ethics office Not 
relevant 
Low Medium Positive influence may be limited to 
societies with good governance. 
Raising Public Sector 
wages 
 
Negligible Low Medium May have positive impact on petty 
corruption but little impact on grand 
corruption. Negative impact if part of 
problem is excessive public employment. 
Reducing Wage Compression 
 
Negligible Negl. Negligible More relevant as an incentive mechanism 
for career development. May increase 
corruption if the public sector viewed as 
lucrative career option by greedy elements 
of society. 
Merit based civil 
service 
Low Medium High May be derailed by bureaucratic processes 
in highly corrupt societies. 
Public Opinion 
Surveys 
 
Low Medium Medium Public opinion surveys have served as a 
useful tool in articulating citizens’ 
concerns (e.g. Bangalore scorecard). 
Financial 
accountability 
Low Low Medium Medium appropriate when democratic 
accountability and a substantial 
accounting/bookkeeping infrastructure 
with some integrity are in place. 
Parliamentary 
oversight 
Low Medium Medium Parliamentary oversight can be helpful but 
parliamentary micro-management not an 
effective form of governance. 
Reducing Public 
Employment 
Medium Low Low May reduce opportunities for corruption . 
Decentralization Medium Low Low May improve accountability and may 
increase sense of social purpose for public 
officials. 
Client-based civil 
service / Bureaucratic 
culture 
Medium Medium Low Success depends upon service delivery 
orientation of public service, reinforced by 
accountability for results. 
Economic policy 
reform 
High Medium Low Reduces potential corruption by shifting 
decision-making to the private sector. 
Media and judicial 
independence, citizen 
participation 
High Medium Low Allows for detection, followed by 
accountability. 
Reducing Public 
Sector Size 
 
High Medium Low By reducing the number of government 
activities, officials can focus on primary 
objectives of the state. 
Rule of law High Medium Low Essential for any progress. 
 
Source: Huther and Shah (2000, 9-10) 
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In view of assessing the anti-corruption strategies, efficacy will require a measurement of 
the effect of a certain set of anti-corruption activities on the level of corruption or 
corrupted activity. 
On the other hand, an anti-corruption strategy will be considered efficient when it 
generates maximum reduction in the corruption incidence (good targeting), associated 
with welfare gains obtained with reduced costs. 
Concerning sustainability, the anti-corruption activities are sustainable if they produce 
changes in the expectations on public officials’ responsibilities. 
 
Table 5 presents a relevant synthesis on the significance of the four criteria for assessing 
the anti-corruption strategies. 
 
         Table 5: Summary of Proposed Rating Factors for Anti-Corruption Programs 
 
Relevance  Program objectives consistent with country’s development priorities, 
with Bank strategy 
 Program design underpinned by analytical work that recognizes country 
specific public sector mission and values, opportunities and constraints 
and an informed view of potential impacts of alternative actions 
 Judgments as to (a) the degree to which the anti-corruption programs 
were targeted to corruption drivers; (b) the relationship between those 
drivers, corruption and welfare outcomes. 
Efficacy  The extent to which the project’s objectives were achieved, or expected 
to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance in curtailing 
corruption. 
 Judgments to be made about the degree to which Bank supported 
interventions have (i) reduced , (ii) had no impact, or (iii) led to an 
increase in, levels of various forms of corruption in the country. As a 
proxy focus on the relationship between Bank supported interventions 
and changes in key corruption drivers. 
 
Efficiency  generates most reductions in corruption and associated welfare gains for 
the least cost 
 targets corruption that has large costs 
Sustainability  the resilience to risk of net benefit flows over time based upon an 
assessment of political, economic, financial , social and external 
influences 
 
 
Source: Huther and Shah (2000, 11) 
 
The two instruments proposed by the World Bank for assessing the anti-corruption 
strategies should be accompanied, each time, by better knowledge about the realities in 
every state. In view of integrating those anti-corruption strategies in the strategies aimed 
at improving the governance quality, preliminary conclusions are configured and 
presented synthetically by the same authors in Table 6. 
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          Table 6: Effective Anti-Corruption Programs Based on Governance Quality 
 
Incidence of 
Corruption 
Governance 
Quality 
Priorities of Anti-Corruption Efforts 
(Based on Drivers of corruption) 
High Poor Establish rule of law, strengthen institutions of participation and 
accountability; limit government interventions to focus on core mandate 
Medium Fair Decentralization and economic policy reforms; results-oriented 
management and evaluation; introduction of incentives for competitive 
public service delivery 
Low Good Explicit anti-corruption programs such as anti-corruption agencies; 
strengthen financial management; raising public and officials awareness; 
no bribery pledges, fry big fish, etc. 
 
Source: Huther and Shah (2000, 12) 
 
II.3  Models developed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) – 
Steves – Rousso Model  
 
Steves and Rousso (2003, 4-7) present the methodology for assessing the anti-corruption 
strategies, developed by EBRD. In view to respond to concrete needs for assessing the 
anti-corruption strategies in former European communist states, the above authors’ 
approach is correlated with other EBRD initiatives; EBRD together with World Bank 
achieved several rounds of Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys 
(BEEPS). If we add the periodical evaluations, usually annual ones, on the level of 
corruption, achieved by World Bank, Transparency International or other transnational 
actors, we have a complex set of instruments, providing the possibility to assess the 
impact of anti-corruption strategies. 
 
The below presentation follows closely the study of Steves – Rousso (2003); based on the 
main conclusions from the first and second BEEPS rounds, they have conceptualised and 
coded “a matrix of anti-corruption activities”  (Steves and Rousso, 2003, 5). 
Those activities are divided in three general categories, as follows: 
 omnibus reform programmes; 
 new legislation targeted at anti-corruption; 
 accession to international covenants and membership in international anti-
corruption coalitions.  
 
The above authors have developed, for each category, a grading system, representing the 
basis of calculation  for an index specific for each category: Omnibus Index (OI), Legal 
Index (LI) and Conventions Index (CI). 
Thus an anti-corruption matrix is obtained. Table 7 presents its variables and weights. 
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Table 7: Anti-corruption matrix variables and weighting 
 
Intensity Index         
(II-AC)                              
Notation Weight
(W) 
Intensity Index         
(II-AC)                               
Notation Weight
(W) 
Omnibus Index   OI 33.4 Legal Index                        LI 5.55 
National anti-corruption 
strategy                              
OI1 11.2 Civil Service Law               LI.1 5.55 
     Adopted OI1.1 5.56 Financial Disclosure Law   LI.2 5.55 
     Involved NGOS            OI1.2 2.78 Public Procurement Law     LI.3 5.55 
     Multi-branch OI1.3 2.78 Freedom of Information 
Law                                     
LI.4 5.55 
Anti-corruption action 
plan                                    
OI2 11.1 Party Finance Law              LI.5 5.55 
     Adopted OI2.1 5.55 Anti-Money Laundering 
Law                                     
LI.6 5.55 
     Involved NGOS            OI2.2 2.78 Conventions Index*         CI 33.3 
     Multi-branch OI2.3 2.78 Stability Pact anti-
Corruption Initiative           
CI.1 5.55 
Anti-corruption 
commission or 
ombudsmen                
OI3 11.1 OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention                          
CI.2 5.55 
     Established OI3.1 5.56 COE GRECO CI.3 5.55 
     Involved NGOS            OI3.2 1.11 COE Convention on 
Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and  
Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime          
CI.4 5.55 
     Multi-branch OI3.3 1.11 COE Criminal Law 
Convention on 
Corruption             
CI.5 5.55 
     Independent                  OI3.4 3.33 COE Civil Law 
Convention on 
Corruption                     
CI.6 5.55 
 
*In the non-Stability Pact countries, the other five indicators in this Index represent 6.66 per cent of the 
Intensity Index. 
 
Source:  Steves and Rousso (2003, 6). 
 
 
At the same time, each category was divided in several specific criteria, based on specific 
activities in every country. 
 
Consequently, for the activities specific to OI, an assessment is proposed. 
OI.1  the design and publication of an anti-corruption strategy;  
OI.2  the development of an implementing anti-corruption action plan; 
OI.3  the establishment of a national anti-corruption commission, ombudsman or  
similar authority, aimed to coordinate  and to monitor the achievement of  
objectives and activities from the national anti-corruption strategy. 
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For each criterion in the matrix,  “1” was coded if the respective anti-corruption measures 
were introduced and “0” was coded if contrary. 
 
As remarked in Table 7, these three major components of the OI  are weighted equally. 
 
The authors considered not only a formal consignment of the activities mentioned but 
also some aspects concerning their design, content and operationalization. 
Thus, for each criterion there are sub criteria, as also remarked in Table 7. They refer 
mainly to: 
 involving the non governmental organizations in developing the anti-corruption 
activities; 
 complex structure of the strategy comprising several governmental branches or 
ministries such as that of justice, administration and home affairs etc. 
 formal independence of anti-corruption commission/authority before the 
government. 
 
For the activities specific to LI, concerning a new  anti-corruption legislation, six criteria 
were developed on achieving, implementing or amending six laws, chosen on the basis of  
a careful observation of the specificity of the regulatory framework in the states 
mentioned.  
 
Concerning CI, it evaluates the commitment of the states analysed to ratify and respect 
international conventions and standards, as well as their participation in international 
bodies and coalitions. 
 
To refine this index, 1/3 was given for signing the instrument, 2/3 for signing and 
ratifying, and “1” if the document has been signed, ratified and has entered into force. 
 
By aggregating these three indicators, an overall index will be obtained  (Intensity Index 
for anti-corruption, II-AC), in view to evaluate the impact of the anti-corruption strategies 
in each state as well as to make comparisons and correlations with adjacent processes and 
phenomena, specific for the states analysed. 
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III. A new model for assessing the anti-corruption strategies:   
       Steves-Rousso dynamic model  
 
 
The analysis presented by Steves and Rousso (2003) referred to former communist states 
in transition and it covered the time horizon: 1999-2002. The quantification of activities 
in matrix had a single value for the whole period of time, determining us to consider this 
method as a static one. 
In our view, the anti-corruption strategies and the whole ensemble accompanying them, 
represent the basis of a developing process in close accordance with the other processes 
characterising the reforms of societies in transition. 
The experience shows that the internalization of new social rules in the public 
organizations, the implementation of the new mechanisms of social organization 
stipulated in the anti-corruption strategies require a longer period of time, being a process 
in development. 
In this context, the new proposed model takes into consideration a longer period of 
reference (10 years) and the quantitative assessment of the anti-corruption actions is 
variable. 
 
 
III.1. Dynamic matrix of anti-corruption activities ([A-C]) 
 
Therefore, the dynamic matrix that we propose, will have variable annual quantifications, 
as follows: 
 a series of Intensity Indices  ([II-AC])– OI.1.1, OI.2.1, OI.3.1, OI.3.4 – as well as 
CI1-6 are quasi constant during the period analysed; they may vary only when the 
activities quantified are amended, modified or replaced with new ones. In this 
situation, it is valid the principle of overlapping the effects. 
 the other II-AC vary annually in a linear way, since the year when they were 
adopted or integrated in the national legislative and institutional framework. Their 
values are cumulative and take into consideration eventual amendments, changes 
or replacements; it is also valid the principle of overlapping the effects. 
 the dynamic matrix will have the same structure as the matrix proposed by Steves 
and Rousso and the weights (w) of each II-AC are maintained. 
 
Methodologically, the matrix [A-C] will be determined as follows: 
 a column will be allocated to each II-AC in [A-C];  
 a number of rows equal to the number of years (n) during the period analysed will 
be allocated to every state analysed; 
 based on the analysis of the anti-corruption activities in every state during the 
period analysed, a nominal support matrix will be drawn up, with the same 
structure as [A-C], marking for every II-AC, the relevant data on the year of 
adopting/setting up/ achieving the activities aimed by II-AC as well as the year of 
their changing/completing/restructuring (if applicable). Thus for every II-AC we 
obtain temporal data (years), n1  < n2 < …nk which will determine k periods, pi, 
when the activity corresponding to II-AC is stable (pi = n – ni , i = 1,2, … k) 
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 Numerical values will be assigned annually for every II-AC and every state, as 
follows: 
 For quasi-constant indices, for every state and for every year during a 
period pi, a part wi from the weight (w) will be awarded, corresponding to 
II-AC, wi = w/k.  For the periods overlapping, the numbers wi will be 
totalised, and 0 percentage will be allocated to the years belonging to no 
period. 
 For the variable linear indices, the allocation will be also annual-based and 
specific to every period. Unlike quasi-constant II-AC, in this case, in every 
period  pi , and every year, ni , the allocation will be as follows:  
 1 ijiij nnnww . As in the previous case, for the periods overlapping,  
 the numbers wi will be totalised, and 0 percentage will be allocated to the  
years belonging to no period. Thus for every II-AC, we obtain increasing 
allocations, overlapped related to the periods of amending/updating the 
legislation, strategies etc. In the empiric example that we shall present 
below, we will remark, concretely, how we obtain the matrix [A-C]. We 
will find out that the  matrix [A-C] depends on the period of analysis and 
annually the values II-AC are usually increasing  according to the 
thoroughness of the implementation for strategies, action plans, domestic 
and international legislation on anti-corruption actions. 
 
 
III.1.2. Empirical analysis of the national anti-corruption strategies in some South-
Eastern European states 
 
The analysis presented below will have illustrative character in view of using the 
dynamic anti-corruption matrix. 
The sample of analysed states comprises three EU Member States (Bulgaria (BG), 
Romania (RO) and Slovenia (SI)), an acceding state (Croatia (HR)) and other two South-
Eastern European states (Moldova (MD) and Serbia (SE)). The sample also covers the 
Western Balkans as well as the former Soviet Union, respectively former Yugoslavia 
Federation. 
The period analysed is 1999-2008. 
Using the documentary database as well as sources quoted in Matei and Matei (2010), 
Annex 1 comprises the nominal support matrix for achieving [A-C] in the above-
mentioned states. 
Annex 2 presents the effective calculation of II-AC as well as of primary indices – OI, LI 
and CI.  
The overall remark is that the statistic variables associated both to primary indices and 
composite index II-AC have increasing values, fact which highlights the developing 
character of processes characterising the anti-corruption activities. 
The rhythms for the achievement and implementation of anti-corruption strategies are 
different. The calculation of statistic correlations reveals very high coefficients of 
correlation (between 0.939 (SI/HR) and 0.993 (MD/BG)); this fact is natural, taking into 
consideration the objectives of European integration of the respective states and 
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compliance with the transnational anti-corruption frameworks, promoted by World Bank, 
OECD and, of course, EU. 
We also remark the effects of enforcing the anti-corruption strategies in their correlation 
with the index of control of corruption (KKM), developed by the World Bank. 
 
 
                                          Table 8: Correlations II-AC/KKM 
 
    
BG_KKM 
 
 
HR_KKM 
 
 
MD_KKM 
 
 
RO_KKM 
 
SE_KKM 
 
SI_KKM 
BG_II_AC Pearson Correlation .306 .562 -.308 .863(**) .929(**) .201 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .390 .091 .387 .001 .000 .577 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 10 
HR_II_AC Pearson Correlation .385 .663(*) -.420 .804(**) .892(**) .093 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .272 .036 .227 .005 .001 .798 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 10 
MD_II_AC Pearson Correlation .341 .586 -.339 .862(**) .906(**) .204 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .335 .075 .338 .001 .000 .571 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 10 
RO_II_AC Pearson Correlation .348 .602 -.356 .801(**) .901(**) .146 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .325 .065 .313 .005 .000 .688 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 10 
SE_II_AC Pearson Correlation .363 .617 -.376 .829(**) .890(**) .120 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .302 .057 .284 .003 .001 .742 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 10 
SI_II_AC Pearson Correlation .340 .487 -.251 .848(**) .921(**) .375 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .336 .154 .485 .002 .000 .286 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 10 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
The statistic correlations, described in Table 8 for 1999-2008 are relevant and 
demonstrate inverse negative correlations (MD, -0.339) or small positive correlations 
(BG, 0.306; SI, 0.375) or high correlations (HR, 0.663; RO, 0.801; SE, 0.890). 
 
The conclusions of such findings are more profound and may lead to inadequacy of the 
anti-corruption strategies in some states, revealing an inappropriate perception of 
corruption as well as to inadequacy of the instrument of analysis. In fact, concerning this 
last conclusion, an explanation may be the difficulty of collecting data and information 
that reflect the actual reality in the states analysed. 
 
At the same time, the quantitative analysis should be accompanied by a more refined 
qualitative analysis in view to emphasise other processes influencing the anti-corruption 
actions: political stability, courts of law, civil society etc. 
The new model presented is closer to the realities in South-Eastern European states,  and 
could represent the pillar of objective analyses on the developments in a certain state or 
comparative analyses. 
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                     Annex 1: Nominal support matrix for II-AC 
 
 
 
 
Omnibus Index  
      OI1 
Omnibus Index  
    OI2 
   Omnibus Index   
       OI3 
                 Legal Index 
                       LI 
            Conventions Index     
                        CI 
 
 
 
 
State 
 
Year    
OI 
1.1 
  
OI 
1.2 
  
OI 
1.3 
  
OI 
2.1 
  
OI 
2.2 
  
OI 
2.3 
  
OI 
3.1 
  
OI 
3.2 
  
OI 
3.3 
  
OI 
3.4 
  
LI 
1 
  
LI 
2 
  
LI 
3 
  
LI 
4 
 
LI 
5 
 
LI 
6 
 
CI 
1 
 
CI 
2 
 
CI 
3 
 
CI 
4 
 
CI 
5 
 
CI 
6 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
BG  
 
1999           x     x x x x    
BG  
 
2000              x      x x x 
BG  
 
2001 x x x        X* x x  x        
BG  
 
2002    x x x x x x x    X*  
        
BG  
 
2003                       
BG  
 
2004    X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
                
BG  
 
2005       X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
   X* 
 
X* 
 
       
BG  
 
2006 X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
          X* 
 
        
BG  
 
2007           X* 
 
    X* 
 
      
BG  
 
2008                       
HR 
 
1999                 x      
HR 
 
2000           x        x x x x 
HR 
 
2001       x x x x   x x         
HR 
 
2002 x x x x x x                 
HR 
 
2003             X* 
 
X* 
 
 x       
HR 
 
2004                       
HR 
 
2005 X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
                
HR 
 
2006           X* 
 
           
 23 
0 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
HR 
 
2007                       
HR 
 
2008 
 
               X*       
MD 
 
1999           x  x  x  x  x    
MD 
 
2000            x  x      x x x 
MD 
 
2001       x x x x      x       
MD 
 
2002                       
MD 
 
2003                       
MD 
 
2004 x x x x x x                 
MD 
 
2005                       
MD 
 
2006    X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
                
MD 
 
2007                X* 
 
      
MD 
 
2008                       
RO  
 
1999           x  x  x x   x    
RO 
 
2000                 x   x   
RO 
 
2001 x x x x x x x x x     x       x x 
RO 
 
2002       X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
      X* 
 
      
RO 
 
2003               X* 
 
       
RO 
 
2004                       
RO 
 
2005 X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
 
 
     X* 
 
      
RO 
 
2006           X* 
 
 X* 
 
  X* 
 
      
RO 
 
2007                       
RO 
 
2008                       
SE  
 
1999                       
SE 
 
2000                 x   x x x 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
SE  
 
2001 x x x x x x x x x x             
SE  
 
2002             x          
SE  
 
2003               x    x    
SE  
 
2004              x         
SE  
 
2005 X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
X* 
 
    x     x       
SE  
 
2006                       
SE  
 
2007                       
SE  
 
2008                       
SI  
 
1999                   x    
SI  
 
2000                       
SI  
 
2001             x  x   x  x x x 
SI  
 
2002           x x  x         
SI  
 
2003                       
SI  
 
2004 x x x x x x x x x x             
SI  
 
2005              X* 
 
        
SI  
 
2006             X* 
 
         
SI  
 
2007                x       
SI  
 
2008                       
 
                      Legend: new attribute, modified or amended X* 
 
           Source: the authors 
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Annex 2: Numerical quantification for II-AC 
 
                  Omnibus Index  
                         OI 
              Legal Index 
                LI 
           Conventions Index     
                  CI 
 
 
 
State 
 
 
 
Year  
  
OI 
1.1 
  
OI 
1.2 
  
OI 
1.3 
  
OI 
2.1 
  
OI 
2.2 
  
OI 
2.3 
  
OI 
3.1 
  
OI 
3.2 
  
OI 
3.3 
  
OI 
3.4 
 
∑OI 
  
LI 
1 
  
LI 
2 
  
LI 
3 
  
LI 
4 
 
LI 
5 
 
LI 
6 
 
∑LI 
 
CI 
1 
 
CI 
2 
 
CI 
3 
 
CI 
4 
 
CI 
5 
 
CI 
6 
 
∑CI 
 
 
∑ 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
BG  
 
1999 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.18 - - - - 0.28 0.46 5.56 5.56 5.56 - - - 16.68 17.14 
BG  
 
2000 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.36 - - 0.14 - 0.56 1.06 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 34.42 
BG  
 
2001 2.78 0.14 0.14 - - - - - - - 3.06 0.72 0.56 0.56 0.28 0.28 0.84 3.24 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 39.66 
BG  
 
2002 2.78 0.28 0.28 2.78 0.14 0.14 2.78 0.06 0.06 1.66 10.96 1.08 1.11 1.11 0.56 0.56 1.12 5.54 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 49.86 
BG  
 
2003 2.78 0.42 0.42 2.78 0.28 0.28 2.78 0.11 0.11 1.66 11.62 1.44 1.67 1.67 0.84 0.84 1.4 7.86 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 52.84 
BG  
 
2004 2.78 0.56 0.56 5.56 0.56 0.56 2.78 0.17 0.17 1.66 15.36 1.80 2.22 2.22 1.12 1.12 1.68 10.16 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 58.88 
BG  
 
2005 2.78 0.70 0.70 5.56 0.84 0.84 5.56 0.28 0.28 3.33 20.87 2.16 2.78 2.78 1.54 1.40 1.96 12.62 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 66.85 
BG  
 
2006 5.56 0.98 0.98 5.56 1.12 1.12 5.56 0.39 0.39 3.33 24.99 2.52 3.34 3.34 2.10 1.96 2.24 15.50 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 73.85 
BG  
 
2007 5.56 1.24 1.24 5.56 1.40 1.40 5.56 0.50 0.50 3.33 26.29 3.06 3.89 3.89 2.66 2.52 2.52 18.54 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 78.14 
BG  
 
2008 5.56 1.54 1.54 5.56 1.68 1.68 5.56 0.61 0.61 3.33 27.67 3.6 4.45 4.45 3.22 3.08 3.08 21.88 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 82.91 
HR 
 
1999 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5.56 - - - - - 5.56 5.56 
HR 
 
2000 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.28 - 0.28 0.28 0.56 - 1.40 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 29.20 
HR 
 
2001 - - - - - - 5.56 0.11 0.11 3.33 9.11 0.56 - 0.56 0.56 1.12 - 2.80 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 39.71 
HR 
 
2002 2.78 0.14 0.14 2.78 0.14 0.14 5.56 0.22 0.22 3.33 15.45 0.84 - 0.84 0.84 1.68 - 4.2 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 47.45 
HR 
 
2003 2.78 0.28 0.28 2.78 0.28 0.28 5.56 0.33 0.33 3.33 16.23 1.12 - 1.40 1.40 2.24 0.28 6.44 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 50.47 
HR 
 
2004 2.78 0.42 0.42 2.78 0.42 0.42 5.56 0.44 0.44 3.33 17.01 1.40 - 1.96 1.96 2.80 0.56 8.68 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 53.49 
HR 
 
2005 5.56 0.70 0.70 5.56 0.70 0.70 5.56 0.55 0.55 3.33 23.91 1.68 - 2.52 2.52 3.36 0.84 10.92 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 62.63 
HR 
 
2006 5.56 0.98 0.98 5.56 0.98 0.98 5.56 0.66 0.66 3.33 25.25 1.96 - 3.08 3.08 3.92 1.12 13.16 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 66.21 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
 
HR 
 
 
2007 
 
5.56 
 
1.26 
 
1.26 
 
5.56 
 
1.26 
 
1.26 
 
5.56 
 
0.77 
 
0.77 
 
3.33 
 
26.59 
 
2.52 
 
- 
 
3.64 
 
3.64 
 
4.48 
 
1.40 
 
15.68 
 
5.56 
 
- 
 
5.56 
 
5.56 
 
5.56 
 
5.56 
 
27.80 
 
70.07 
HR 
 
2008 5.56 1.54 1.54 5.56 1.54 1.54 5.56 0.88 0.88 3.33 27.93 3.08 - 4.20 4.20 5.04 1.96 18.48 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 74.21 
MD 
 
1999 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.56 - 0.56 - 0.56 - 1.68 5.56 - 5.56 - - - 11.12 12.80 
MD 
 
2000 - - - - - - - - - - - 1.12 0.56 1.12 0.56 1.12 - 4.48 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 32.28 
MD 
 
2001 - - - - - - 5.56 0.11 0.11 3.33 9.11 1.68 1.12 1.68 1.12 1.68 0.28 7.56 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 44.47 
MD 
 
2002 - - - - - - 5.56 0.22 0.22 3.33 9.33 2.24 1.68 2.24 1.68 2.24 0.56 10.64 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 47.77 
MD 
 
2003 - - - - - - 5.56 0.33 0.33 3.33 9.55 2.80 2.24 2.80 2.24 2.80 0.84 13.72 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 51.07 
MD 
 
2004 5.56 0.28 0.28 2.78 0.14 0.14 5.56 0.44 0.44 3.33 18.95 3.36 2.80 3.36 2.80 3.36 1.12 16.80 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 63.55 
MD 
 
2005 5.56 0.56 0.56 2.78 0.28 0.28 5.56 0.55 0.55 3.33 20.01 3.92 3.36 3.92 3.36 3.92 1.40 19.88 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 67.69 
MD 
 
2006 5.56 0.84 0.84 5.56 0.42 0.42 5.56 0.66 0.66 3.33 23.85 4.48 3.92 4.48 3.92 4.48 1.68 22.96 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 74.61 
MD 
 
2007 5.56 1.12 1.12 5.56 0.70 0.70 5.56 0.77 0.77 3.33 25.14 5.04 4.48 5.04 4.48 5.04 2.24 26.32 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 79.31 
MD 
 
2008 5.56 1.40 1.40 5.56 0.98 0.98 5.56 0.88 0.88 3.33 26.53 5.56 5.04 5.56 5.04 5.56 2.80 29.56 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 83.89 
RO  
 
1999 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.28 - 0.28 - 0.28 0.14 0.98 - - 5.56 - - - 5.56 6.54 
RO 
 
2000 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.56 - 0.56 - 0.56 0.28 1.96 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 - - 16.68 18.64 
RO 
 
2001 2.78 0.14 0.14 2.78 0.14 0.14 1.85 0.04 0.04 1.11 9.16 0.84 - 0.84 0.56 0.84 0.42 3.50 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 40.46 
RO 
 
2002 2.78 0.28 0.28 2.78 0.28 0.28 3.70 0.08 0.08 2.22 12.76 1.12 - 1.12 1.12 1.12 0.70 5.18 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 45.68 
RO 
 
2003 2.78 0.42 0.42 2.78 0.42 0.42 3.70 0.16 0.16 2.22 13.48 1.4 - 1.4 1.68 1.68 0.98 7.14 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 48.42 
RO 
 
2004 2.78 0.56 0.56 2.78 0.56 0.56 3.70 0.24 0.24 2.22 14.20 1.68 - 1.68 2.24 2.24 1.26 9.1 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 51.10 
RO 
 
2005 5.56 0.70 0.70 5.56 0.70 0.70 5.56 0.32 0.32 3.33 23.45 1.96 - 1.96 2.80 2.80 1.54 11.06 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 62.91 
RO 
 
2006 5.56 0.98 0.98 5.56 0.98 0.98 5.56 0.43 0.43 3.33 24.79 2.52 - 2.52 3.36 3.36 1.96 13.72 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 66.31 
RO 
 
2007 5.56 1.26 1.26 5.56 1.26 1.26 5.56 0.54 0.54 3.33 26.13 3.08 - 3.08 3.92 3.92 2.52 16.52 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 70.45 
 
 
 27 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
RO 
 
2008 
 
 
5.56 1.54 1.54 5.56 1.54 1.54 5.56 0.65 0.65 3.33 27.47 3.64 - 3.64 4.48 4.48 3.08 19.32 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 74.59 
SE  
 
1999 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
SE  
 
2000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5.56 - - 5.56 5.56 5.56 22.24 22.24 
SE  
 
2001 2.78 0.14 0.14 2.78 0.14 0.14 5.56 0.11 0.11 3.33 15.23 - -  - - - - 5.56 - - 5.56 5.56 5.56 22.24 37.47 
SE  
 
2002 2.78 0.28 0.28 2.78 0.28 0.28 5.56 0.22 0.22 3.33 16.01 - - 0.56 - - - 0.56 5.56 - - 5.56 5.56 5.56 22.24 38.81 
SE  
 
2003 2.78 0.42 0.42 2.78 0.42 0.42 5.56 0.33 0.33 3.33 16.79 - - 1.12 - 0.56 - 1.68 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 46.27 
SE  
 
2004 2.78 0.56 0.56 2.78 0.56 0.56 5.56 0.44 0.44 3.33 17.57 - - 1.68 0.56 1.12 - 3.36 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 48.73 
SE  
 
2005 5.56 0.84 0.84 5.56 0.84 0.84 5.56 0.55 0.55 3.33 24.47 0.56 - 2.24 1.12 1.68 0.56 6.16 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 58.43 
SE  
 
2006 5.56 1.12 1.12 5.56 1.12 1.12 5.56 0.66 0.66 3.33 25.81 1.12 - 2.80 1.68 2.24 1.12 8.96 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 65.57 
SE  
 
2007 5.56 1.40 1.40 5.56 1.40 1.40 5.56 0.77 0.77 3.33 27.11 1.68 - 3.36 2.24 2.80 1.68 11.76 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 66.67 
SE  
 
2008 5.56 1.68 1.68 5.56 1.68 1.68 5.56 0.88 0.88 3.33 28.49 2.24 - 3.92 2.80 3.36 2.24 14.56 5.56 - 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 27.80 70.85 
SI  
 
1999 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5.56 - 5.56 - - - 11.12 11.12 
SI  
 
2000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5.56 - 5.56 - - - 11.12 11.12 
SI  
 
2001 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.28 - 0.56 - 0.84 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 35.04 
SI  
 
2002 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.28 1.12 - 3.08 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 36.44 
SI  
 
2003 - - - - - - - - - - - 1.12 1.12 0.84 0.56 1.68 - 5.32 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 38.68 
SI  
 
2004 5.56 0.28 0.28 5.56 0.28 0.28 5.56 0.11 0.11 3.33 21.35 1.68 1.68 1.12 0.84 2.24 - 7.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 62.27 
SI  
 
2005 5.56 0.56 0.56 5.56 0.56 0.56 5.56 0.22 0.22 3.33 22.69 2.24 2.24 1.40 1.12 2.80 - 9.80 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 65.85 
SI  
 
2006 5.56 0.84 0.84 5.56 0.84 0.84 5.56 0.33 0.33 3.33 24.03 2.80 2.80 1.68 1.68 3.36 - 12.32 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 69.71 
SI  
 
2007 5.56 1.12 1.12 5.56 1.12 1.12 5.56 0.44 0.44 3.33 25.37 3.36 3.36 2.24 2.24 3.92 0.56 15.68 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 74.41 
SI  
 
2008 5.56 1.40 1.40 5.56 1.40 1.40 5.56 0.55 0.55 3.33 26.71 3.92 3.92 2.80 2.80 4.48 1.12 19.04 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 33.36 79.11 
Source: the authors 
